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Empirical research has exposed a troubling pattern of capital
punishment in the United States, with extralegal factors such as race, class,
and gender strongly correlated with the probability of a death sentence.
Capital sentencing also shows significant geographic disparities, although
existing research tends to be more descriptive than explanatory. This study
offers an alternative conception of local legal culture to explain place-based
variation in the outcomes of federal capital trials, accounting for the level of
attorney time and expert resources granted by the federal courts to defend
against a death sentence. Using frequentist and Bayesian methods—
supplemented with expert interviews—we empirically assess the processes
determining the total allocation of defense resources in federal death penalty
trials at the peak of the federal death penalty—between 1998 and 2004. Our
findings strongly connect extralegal factors to the lowest levels of defense
resources, which in turn correlate with a higher risk of a death sentence. Far
from being idiosyncratic discrepancies, these are systemic and systematic
extralegal factors that stand between a defendant and his opportunity to
defend against a death sentence. Ultimately, we argue for a
reconceptualization of extralegal influences and the relationship between
local legal culture and capital case outcomes.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Supreme Court’s 1972 ruling in Furman v. Georgia1 and its
subsequent 1976 ruling in Gregg v. Georgia2 prompted an explosion of
scholarship surrounding the death penalty, with particular emphasis on the
extralegal factors observed in sentencing patterns.3 Rather than entertaining
whether capital punishment is justified in principle, empirical scholarship has
focused primarily on disparities in the death penalty’s practice and
administration.4 Contemporary social science research has firmly established
“a pattern of evidence indicting racial disparities in the charging, sentencing,
and imposition of the death penalty after the Furman decision.”5 In
particular, research indicates that capital defendants are more likely to
receive the death penalty if, among other factors, a) the defendant is black,
b) the victim is white, c) the victim is a white female, or d) the defendant is
poor.6
Although these findings are consistent across studies, little work has
been able to define and compare the effects of these four factors across
jurisdictions and certainly within a federal system that is ostensibly uniform
and less subject to the variation and issues observed in state-by-state death
penalty systems. While race effects are more salient than geographic effects,
1

408 U.S. 238 (1972).
428 U.S. 153 (1976).
3
Lindsey S. Vann, Comment, History Repeats Itself: The Post-Furman Return to
Arbitrariness in Capital Punishment, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 1255, 1256 (2011).
4
See infra Section II.
5
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GGD-90-57, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING:
RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERNS OF RACIAL DISPARITIES. REPORT TO SENATE AND HOUSE
COMMITTEES ON THE JUDICIARY 5 (1990).
6
Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime
but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1836 (1994); Sheldon Ekland-Olson,
Structured Discretion, Racial Bias and the Death Penalty: The First Decade After Furman in
Texas, 69 SOC. SCI. Q. 853, 853 (1988); Linda A. Foley, Florida After the Furman Decision:
The Effect of Extralegal Factors on the Processing of Capital Offense Cases, 5 BEHAV. SCI. &
L. 457, 457–58 (1987); Samuel R. Gross & Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis of
Racial Disparities in Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN. L. REV. 27,
105 (1984); Gary Kleck, Racial Discrimination in Criminal Sentencing: A Critical Evaluation
of the Evidence with Additional Evidence on the Death Penalty, 46 AM. SOC. REV. 783, 798–
99 (1981); Rory K. Little, Why a Federal Death Penalty Moratorium?, 33 CONN. L. REV. 791,
807 (2001).
2
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we generally know that the risk of a death sentence is higher in some states
and regions than others and that charging and sentencing patterns in capital
cases vary across urban, suburban, and rural areas.7 Existing literature has
demonstrated that public support for and state-level use of the death penalty
is influenced by an interaction of local crime rates and political ideology,8
but the research has not yet been able to explain why those location effects
exist or identify the driving mechanisms behind geographic disparities in
capital punishment practices. Certainly, we may have intuitive or anecdotal
hypotheses for these differences—why, for example, “suburban counties
with lower murder rates than urban counties send more murderers to death
row”—but empirical studies accounting for exactly how these locationspecific differences in capital case processing operate are nascent.9
The present study examines a different disparity in capital litigation—
the defense resources provided to indigent suspects—and in doing so expands
our knowledge of location effects in the bulk of contemporary capital
proceedings. We focus on federal cases at the midpoint of the modern federal
death penalty and examine the role of local legal culture10 and the subcultural
elements of the courtroom workgroup11 that lead to widely differential
allocations of defense resources and which, in turn, are closely tied to
disparate sentencing at trial.12 More specifically, we advance a model of local
7

Michael J. Songer & Isaac Unah, The Effect of Race, Gender, and Location on
Prosecutorial Decisions to Seek the Death Penalty in South Carolina, 58 S.C. L. REV. 161,
178 (2006); JOINT LEGISLATIVE AUDIT AND REVIEW COMMISSION OF THE VIRGINIA GENERAL
ASSEMBLY, REVIEW OF VIRGINIA’S SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 4 (2000),
http://jlarc.virginia.gov/pdfs/reports/Rpt274.pdf; AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
Scattering
Justice:
Geographic
Disparities
of
the
Death
Penalty,
https://www.aclu.org/scattered-justice-geographic-disparities-death-penalty (last visited Feb.
21, 2016).
8
John Blume & Theodore Eisenberg, Judicial Politics, Death Penalty Appeals, and Case
Selection: An Empirical Study, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 465, 500 (1999); see also David Jacobs &
Stephanie L. Kent, The Determinants of Executions Since 1951: How Politics, Protests, Public
Opinion, and Social Divisions Shape Capital Punishment, 54 SOC. PROBS. 297, 298 (2007).
9
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 7.
10
BRIAN OSTROM, CHARLES W. OSTROM, ROGER A. HANSON & MATTHEW KLEIMAN,
TRIAL COURTS AS ORGANIZATIONS 46 (2007); Thomas W. Church, Jr., Examining Local Legal
Culture, 3 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 449, 450 (1985); Brian Ostrom, Roger Hanson, Charles
Ostrom & Matthew Kleiman, Court Cultures and their Consequences, 20 CT. MANAGER 22
(2005).
11
DAVID W. NEUBAUER, AMERICA’S COURTS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 108 (9th
ed. 2008); Jeffrey T. Ulmer & Brian Johnson, Sentencing in Context: A Multilevel Analysis,
42 CRIMINOLOGY 137, 166 (2004); Geoff Gallas, Local Legal Culture: More Than Court
Culture, 20 CT. MANAGER 23, 24 (2005).
12
JON B. GOULD & LISA GREENMAN, REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON DEFENDER
SERVICES JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES UPDATE ON THE COST AND QUALITY
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legal culture that relies on composite variables capturing place-based
punitiveness, which also reflect the socio-political climate in which federal
courtroom workgroups (e.g., the judge, prosecutor, and panel defense
attorney) exist.
By focusing on the federal capital process and within a common period,
we are able to assess the extent to which there is arbitrariness (evidenced via
the influence of extralegal variables) in what should be a standardized,
nationwide adjudication process across all ninety-four federal judicial
districts. Further, using defense resources as the dependent variable and
incorporating multiple measures for location effects in regression analyses,
we can more accurately detect the extralegal roles of culture, geography, and
courtroom workgroup characteristics in capital litigation, particularly since
the governing law is essentially uniform across federal district courts.
Our results suggest that a court’s decision to grant defense funding in a
federal capital trial turns on multiple extralegal variables reflective of local
legal culture and court administration practices. With one significant
exception—the type of charge filed—we find that defense resource
allocations are not driven by legally relevant case facts, such as the number
of defendants, offenses, or victims.13 By contrast, our research links the level
of defense resources to the a) social and political climate in which the local
court exists; b) average caseload and processing speed of judges in the
applicable district; and c) background of the presiding judge. Even where our
research finds a correlation between defense resources and the background
and experience of the defense attorney, the relationship evaporates in
regression analysis. This finding, then, advances debate over the endogenous
“chicken-and-egg” question of which courtroom actor most influences
resource decisions—the defense attorney who requests court support or the
judge who makes the decision. Inexperienced lawyers may fail to request
additional (or even sufficient) defense resources, but our findings suggest that
it is judges, operating within the social and political bounds corresponding to
the district’s local legal culture, that choose to appoint these lawyers and set
the expectations and normative practices of representation in the first place.
The result is a system of federal capital litigation that limits the
resources that certain suspects receive for their defense based simply on
where the case is brought. Even in a unitary legal system with common rules
for the provision of defense resources, systematic geographic disparities exist
that rest significantly on extralegal factors. When those resource-related

OF DEFENSE REPRESENTATION IN FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY CASES

52 (2010), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fdpc2010.pdf (last accessed Feb. 21, 2016).
13
See infra pp. 43–50.
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disparities, in turn, are strongly correlated with the likelihood of a death
sentences at trial, the integrity of the federal death penalty is subject to
increased doubt.14
In the following six sections, we present our research and discuss the
implications of the findings. In the next part, Section II, we describe prior
research on the death penalty, highlighting work that has found geographic
differences in charging and sentencing at both the state and federal level,
while also addressing the limited conceptualization of “location effects.” In
Section III, we provide background on federal capital litigation, including the
procedures by which suspects are provided resources for their defense. We
also describe prior research that sets up the question for the present inquiry.
In Section IV, we describe our methodology, explaining our dataset and
hypotheses. The bulk of the paper is contained within Sections V and VI,
where we present the empirical findings and discuss their implications and
significance. We also try our hand at expanding the notion of local legal
culture, particularly as it relates to capital litigation specifically and social
science methodology more broadly. In Section VII, we conclude by
delineating the limits and caveats of our work and suggest avenues for
additional research. Notwithstanding the significance of the federal death
penalty and the troubling implications of our findings, we do not wish to
overstate our claims, given the limitations and specific time period of our
data.
II. PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON THE DEATH PENALTY AND LOCAL LEGAL
CULTURE
For some time now, socio-legal research has established that capital
prosecutions, sentencing, and even executions vary disproportionally based
on extralegal criteria.15 Foremost among these is race, typically conditioned
by socioeconomic status.16 Perhaps the most famous study on this subject
14

See infra Table Two.
We use this term as did Kautt, meaning that the “sources of variation are considered
illegitimate because no act explicitly recognizes them as legitimate. Specifically,
‘geographical location would have to be seen as illegitimate to the extent that it does not reflect
differences in offenders explicitly recognized as legitimate.’” Paula M. Kautt, Location,
Location, Location: Interdistrict and Intercircuit Variation in Sentencing Outcomes for
Federal Drug-Trafficking Offenses, 19 JUST. Q. 633, 635 n.1 (2002). See also DOUGLAS C.
MCDONALD & KENNETH E. CARLSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SENTENCING IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS: DOES RACE MATTER? THE TRANSITION TO SENTENCING GUIDELINES, 1986–
90, Report No. NCJ-145332 at 54 (1993).
16
William J. Bowers & Glenn L. Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimination under PostFurman Capital Statutes, 246 CRIME & DELINQ. 563, 575 (1980); Bright, supra note 6, at 1883;
Linda A. Foley & Richard S. Powell, The Discretion of Prosecutors, Judges, and Juries in
15
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was conducted in Georgia by the late David Baldus and colleagues, which
was considered by the U.S. Supreme Court in McCleskey v. Kemp.17
Although the Court refused to halt McCleskey’s execution in that case, not
one of the justices in the 5-4 majority opinion contested Baldus, et al.’s
finding that Georgia’s capital system was more likely to charge, and then
sentence to death, black defendants who killed white victims.18 In fact, the
Baldus study concluded that “defendants charged with killing white victims
in Georgia were 4.3 times as likely to be sentenced to death as defendants
charged with killing blacks.”19 The controversy surrounding the Court’s
decision in McCleskey is beyond the scope of this paper,20 but the key racerelated issues highlighted in the case were hardly limited to Georgia or even
to the years immediately following Furman and Gregg.21
These problems are further conditioned and aggravated by class and are
generally more pronounced for defendants occupying the lowest rung of the
socio-economic ladder, who may be “defended by lawyers who lack the
skills, resources, and commitment to handle such serious matters.”22 As the
New York Times has editorialized, “capital punishment [in the United States
is] meted out to those without the resources to defend themselves,” and “poor
people . . . are more likely to be charged with capital offenses.”23 Indeed, the
provocative Stephen Bright has questioned whether the death penalty is
“reserved for the worst crime” or “the worst lawyer.”24
Capital Cases, 7 CRIM. JUST. REV. 16, 16 (1982); Thomas Keil & Gennaro Vito, Race and the
Death Penalty in Kentucky Murder Trials: An Analysis of Post-Gregg Outcomes, 7 JUST. Q.
189, 527 (1990). See generally CHARLES S. LANIER, WILLIAM J. BOWERS & JAMES R. ACKER,
THE FUTURE OF AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY: AN AGENDA FOR THE NEXT GENERATION OF
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT RESEARCH (2009); STEPHEN P. GARVEY, BEYOND REPAIR? AMERICA’S
DEATH PENALTY (2002); Scott Phillips, Status Disparities in the Capital of Capital
Punishment, 43 L. & SOC’Y REV. 807, 808 (2009).
17
481 U.S. 279 (1987).
18
See generally id.
19
Id. at 286. Race is therefore an extralegal “defendant risk factor” on three dimensions:
1) if the defendant is black; 2) if the victim is white, and 3) if the defendant is black and the
victim is white.
20
JOHN CALVIN JEFFRIES, JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL: A BIOGRAPHY (2001); David G.
Savage, How Did They Get It So Wrong?, ABA JOURNAL (Jan. 1, 2009 6:30 AM CST),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/how_did_they_get_it_so_wrong/ (last visited
Feb. 21, 2016).
21
Ekland-Olson, supra note 6, at 853; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note
5.
22
Bright, supra note 6, at 1836.
23
The Editorial Board, Countdown to an Execution, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/16/opinion/countdown-to-an-execution-inoklahoma.html?_r=0.
24
Bright, supra note 6, at 1883.
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A. FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY

For all the prior studies on state-level capital practices, there has been
surprisingly little research about the federal death penalty.25 One of the few
studies comes from Cohen and Smith, who examined racial disparities in
federal death sentences and described a broad discontinuity in the federal
capital system, one that applies to defendants regardless of their race.26 As
they note, the “geography of the federal death penalty is anything but
uniform.”27 Of the ninety-four federal district courts across the country, just
six account for one-third of capital authorizations,28 and more than half of
capital cases come from fourteen federal districts.29 Rather than representing
a uniform, national system, these geographic disparities suggest a similar
patchwork of outcomes found in state capital sentencing, which prior
research has linked to local social, political, and cultural forces.30
If capital cases are disproportionately authorized in particular federal
districts, actual death sentences are even more concentrated. Although twothirds of federal districts have never seen a death sentence, upwards of forty
percent of capital sentences are meted out in seven federal districts.31 Table
One below compares the federal districts in which capital authorizations and
sentences have been most concentrated, demonstrating that just four of
them—Louisiana-Eastern (New Orleans), Missouri-Western (Kansas City),
Texas-Eastern (Tyler and Texarkana), and Virginia-Eastern (Richmond and
Northern Virginia)—fall into both categories.32
Table One: Districts in Which Federal Capital Authorizations and
Death Sentences are Most Concentrated

25

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 7; Songer & Unah, supra note 7;
Raymond Paternoster, et al., An Empirical Analysis of Maryland’s Death Sentencing System
with Respect to the Influence of Race and Legal Jurisdiction: Final Report, American Civil
Liberties
Union
(2013),
http://www.aclumd.org/uploaded_files/0000/0376/md_death_penalty_race_study.pdf (last visited Sept. 17,
2015).
26
G. Ben Cohen & Robert J. Smith, The Racial Geography of the Federal Death Penalty,
85 WASH. L. REV. 425, 429 (2010).
27
Id.
28
That is, cases in which the Attorney General authorizes the local U.S. Attorney to seek
the death penalty.
29
Cohen & Smith, supra note 26, at 429.
30
Jeffrey T. Ulmer & John H. Kramer, Court Communities Under Sentencing Guidelines:
Dilemmas of Formal Rationality and Sentencing Disparity, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 383, 384 (1996);
Ulmer & Johnson, supra note 11, at 141.
31
Cohen & Smith, supra note 26, at 426.
32
Id.; see also GOULD & GREENMAN, supra note 12, at 10.
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Federal District

California – Central
Districtof Columbia
Florida – Southern
Louisiana – Eastern
Maryland
Michigan – Eastern
Missouri – Eastern
Missouri – Western
New York – Eastern
NewYork–Southern
Puerto Rico
Tennessee–Western
Texas – Eastern
Texas – Northern
Texas – Western
Virginia – Eastern
Virginia – Western

Capital Authorizations
(Districts together =
50% of cases)
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X

651

Death Sentences
(Districts together =
40% of cases)

X

X

X
X
X
X

How is it that a majority of capital authorizations are concentrated in
fourteen federal districts but most of those districts (ten of fourteen) are
unlikely to sentence substantial numbers of defendants to death? Cohen and
Smith report that the difference is not driven by the crime rate, because the
“number of murders in a particular location bears little relationship to the
number of defendants from that jurisdiction who are sentenced to death in the
federal system.”33 There are other possible explanations, including the
willingness of the local U.S. Attorney to offer or accept a plea or the expertise
of local prosecutors in trying capital cases.34 Without additional data, Table
One would appear to suggest that physical location is either a risk or
protective factor when considering the likelihood of a death sentence. We
present an alternative explanation, one that has received virtually no
consideration in the literature on the federal death penalty—the quality of and
resources made available to the defendant’s legal team.35 We posit that there
33

Cohen & Smith, supra note 26, at 431.
Based on interviews with federal judges (interview notes on file with authors).
35
Phillips has done a remarkable job of documenting the effect of lawyer type on
prosecutors’ capital charging decisions and jurors’ death sentencing in Harris County, Texas
(Houston). Scott Phillips, Legal Disparities in the Capital of Capital Punishment, 99 J. CRIM.
34
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are measurable differences in “local legal culture” across federal judicial
districts and that these varying customs or standards shape the normative
practices and expectations for defense efforts across geographic space.
B. LOCAL LEGAL CULTURE

To the extent that researchers have considered the effect of differing
geographic culture on court processes, much of the work has examined the
norms of the “courtroom workgroup,” which generally refers to the working
relationship between a local judge, prosecutor, and defense attorney.36
Courtroom workgroup studies often prioritize the occupational nuances of
how court cases are actually handled, as opposed to how they are presumed
to proceed according to codified procedure.37 In the U.S., the adversarial
court system presumes a motivated prosecutor is battling head-to-head with
a dedicated defense lawyer, with opposing parties vigorously working on
behalf of their party’s interests.38 However, research suggests that the
difference between court processes “on the books” and those processes “in
practice” is substantial, with the courtroom workgroup frequently being far
from adversarial; the three courtroom agents generally know each other well
and have personal and professional communications that are high in
frequency, duration, intensity, and priority.39
The courtroom workgroup develops shared understandings and values,
creating an occupational subculture specific to that court.40 Together, the
members cooperate in case processing (as opposed to case “battling”), agree
on expected levels of vigor and attention in particular cases, and come to
accept a common range of penalties for sentencing and negotiation practices
for plea-bargaining.41 Rather than arduous opposition, the prosecutor and
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717, 755 (2009). As interesting as his findings are—showing that
defendants who hired their own attorney were much less likely to be sentenced to death—they
are limited to a single jurisdiction. Id. at 750. Moreover, as we explain in Section III, the cost
of defending a federal capital case is so prohibitive that almost all defendants qualify for
appointed counsel.
36
Church, supra note 10, at 470.
37
Christi Metcalfe, The Role of Courtroom Workgroups in Felony Case Dispositions: An
Analysis of Workgroup Familiarity and Similarity, 50 L. & SOC’Y REV. 637, 637 (2016); see
also Gary D. LaFree, Adversarial and Nonadversarial Justice: A Comparison of Guilty Pleas
and Trials, 23 CRIMINOLOGY 289, 289 (1985).
38
Metcalfe, supra note 37, at 638.
39
THOMAS W. CHURCH, JR., ALAN CARLSON, JO-LYNNE LEE & TERESA TANN, JUSTICE
DELAYED: THE PACE OF LITIGATION IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS 60 (1978); JAMES EISENSTEIN,
ROY FLEMMING & PETER NARDULLI, THE CONTOURS OF JUSTICE: COMMUNITIES AND THEIR
COURTS 27–53 (1999); Church, supra note 10, at 471; Gallas, supra note 11, at 25.
40
Church, supra note 10, at 470.
41
Metcalfe, supra note 37, at 638.
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defense lawyer—with the cooperation and oversight of the presiding judge—
create their own courtroom-specific culture that likely varies across different
workgroups.42 Through this lens, the courtroom workgroup can be
understood as a unit that engages in case processing and that these units will
differ between courts, and in this specific study, across federal judicial
districts.
These ensuing shared norms, seen as specific to the courtroom
workgroup, have been called “local legal culture,”43 which reflects “the
values and perceptions of the principal members of the court community and
how they ought to behave and their beliefs about how they actually do behave
in performing their duties.”44 But the term as commonly employed in
existing literature still focuses on productivity measures and the quasibureaucratic character of the courtroom,45 in part because the concept largely
grew out of studies comparing case processing times for the purpose of
understanding and improving court efficiency.46
Legal culture, like any operationalization of culture, has diverse
meanings. Laurence Friedman has distinguished between “internal” and
“external” legal culture.47 The former “refers to the ideas and practices of
legal professionals,” whereas the latter reflects “the opinions, interests, and
pressures brought to bear on law by wider social groups.”48 Under these
definitions, internal legal culture is similar to the courtroom workgroups
described by Eisenstein, et al. and Church,49 but external legal culture is too
broad a concept to explain geographic differences in death penalty
practices.50
Kritzer and Zemans provide a definition of “local legal culture” that lies
between the internal-external culture dichotomy of Friedman.51 To them, the
42

Gallas, supra note 11, at 25; Kathleen Currul-Dykeman, Domestic Violence Case
Processing: A Matter of Local Legal Culture, 17 CONTEMP. JUST. REV. 250, 251 (2014);
Jeffrey T. Ulmer, Christopher Bader & Martha Gault, Do Moral Communities Play a Role in
Criminal Sentencing? Evidence from Pennsylvania, 49 SOC. Q. 737, 739 (2008).
43
Church, supra note 10, at 450.
44
EISENSTEIN, FLEMMING & NARDULLI, supra note 39, at 28.
45
Gallas, supra note 11, at 24.
46
CHURCH, CARLSON, LEE & TANN, supra note 39; see generally Church, supra note 10.
47
Laurence Friedman, The Place of Legal Culture in the Sociology of Law, L. & SOC. 189
(Michael Freeman ed., 2006).
48
David Nelken, Thinking About Legal Culture, 1 ASIAN J.L. & SOC’Y 255, 262 (2014).
49
EISENSTEIN, FLEMMING & NARDULLI, supra note 39, at 52; Church, supra note 10, at
470.
50
Nelken, supra note 48, at 262.
51
Herbert M. Kritzer & Frances K. Zemans, Local Legal Culture and the Control of
Litigation, 27 L. & SOC’Y REV. 535, 538 (1993).
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concept
reflects the complete set of norms and attitudes that govern the operation of
a court system. Some of these norms are reflected in formal rules (e.g., time
limits, discovery limits); others are the natural outgrowth of structural
factors such as caseloads, numbers of players involved in the system, and
the like; and still others are not traceable to formal procedure or structure
but simply reflect a perception of “how we do things here.”52
This description matches that of Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook who,
in examining debtors’ behavior, defined legal culture as “systematic and
persistent variation in local legal practices as a consequence of a complex of
perceptions and expectations shared by many practitioners and officials.”53
More recent scholarship has offered empirical and conceptual bridges
between local legal culture and capital sentencing. Kovarsky has analyzed
state-level concentrations of the death penalty over a twenty-year period,
finding that the geographic concentration of the death penalty is unrelated to
the distribution of homicides.54 Kovarsky argues that there is a combination
of “extreme bureaucratic path dependence” and multiple sites of local
discretion exercised by courtroom stakeholders that drive capital
prosecutions and sentencing.55 Fleury-Steiner, et al. specifically account for
both race and place effects in their examination of “localisms” and “zones of
racial exclusion” that, in turn, influence death sentences in Maricopa County,
Arizona.56
If some scholars have been able to describe local legal culture, sociolegal studies still lack a broad understanding of the influence of extralegal
and cultural forces on sentencing decisions and other case outcomes. In the
discrepancy between law on the books and law in action, there is little
guidance on how best to account for extralegal factors less obvious than race
and class. As Songer and Unah noted in their study, “researchers have not
sufficiently tested the effect of geography and local political culture on

52

Id.
Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Persistence of
Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Evidence from the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 801, 802 (1994).
54
Lee Kovarsky, Muscle Memory and the Local Concentration of Capital Punishment,
66 DUKE L.J. 259, 259 (2016).
55
Id.
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Benjamin Fleury-Steiner, Paul Kaplan & Jamie Longazel, Racist Localisms and the
Enduring Cultural Life of America’s Death Penalty: Lessons from Maricopa County, Arizona,
66 STUD. L., POL., & SOC’Y 63, 71 (2015).
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prosecutorial charging decisions.”57 The same is true for jury verdicts,
sentencing, or judges’ procedural decisions.58 Much of the reason is that the
concept is under-theorized in the literature. Certainly, it is plausible that
elected prosecutors or judges would be influenced by the “norms and
attitudes toward criminal punishment” in the surrounding community and
that, despite being courtroom agents, they are not immune from state, county,
and court-specific cultures, and normative understandings.59
Local legal culture may be under-theorized for a simple logistical
reason: the unavailability of data. We find that existing scholarship
examining local legal culture often emphasize courtroom productivity
measures, in part (or perhaps) because those data are readily available,
quantitative in nature, and readily translatable into a practitioner-oriented
problem. The study of culture differs from a study of courtroom workgroup
productivity, and cultural studies from any disciplinary vantage point involve
working from a qualitative, ethnographic, and/or mixed methods paradigm,
which may be methodologically and logistically challenging to some
scholars.60 For these and other reasons, it is understandably difficult to obtain
access to those judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys whose
occupational culture we aim to better understand.
This study recognizes that courtroom workgroups and the people that
enter federal courts do not exist in a vacuum. Despite a federal process that
is ostensibly consistent and standardized across the country, there are social
and political differences that vary across space and can be understood as
constituting elements of local legal culture. Indeed, it would be unreasonable
to believe that the federal courtroom workgroup in—for the sake of
example—Birmingham, Alabama, will not differ from a workgroup in New
York City on variables related to social, political, and cultural climate.
Whereas federal law and case procedures are written on the books in a way
that is independent of geography, the existing but nascent body of research
on local and regional culture could benefit from a more nuanced
understanding of these subtle yet institutionally embedded extralegal
variables that may significantly sway a decision regarding life or death. One
of the challenges, then—and the purpose of our study—is to determine what
those untraceable influences might be and model their effects. Relying on a
combination of quantitative (both frequentist and Bayesian statistics) and
qualitative methods, this study examines the relationship between local legal
culture and resource allocation for capital cases at the federal level.
57
58
59
60

Songer & Unah, supra note 7, at 178.
Blume & Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 467.
Songer & Unah, supra note 7, at 178.
See generally Church, supra note 10, at 487.
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III. THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY PROCESS
In order to contextualize the methods and data sections that follow, we
offer a brief description of the process for authorizing and defending federal
capital cases. The federal death penalty goes back to before the first
Congress, yet, as one author explains, “the current generation of [the federal
death penalty has] been in business” for only the last twenty years.61 During
that time, the number of death-eligible federal capital defendants surged.62
Whereas there were only twenty-six such defendants in 1993, the number
jumped to sixty-three in 1994 and to an annual number upwards of 150 in
every subsequent year through the end of the decade.63 However, the
Attorney General has consistently sought the death penalty in fewer than half
of cases eligible for a capital prosecution.64
The funnel of federal capital cases narrows further if one compares the
number of capital-authorized cases that go to trial versus those that result in
a guilty plea. In the twenty years from 1989 to 2009, the Department of
Justice (“DOJ”) authorized capital prosecutions against 465 defendants, yet
only 262 of them, or about half, were tried.65 Many of the rest pled guilty
and accepted a sentence of life in prison or even a term of years.66 Just sixtyeight defendants were sentenced to death at trial.67 That figure represents
26% of defendants tried for capital murder, 15% of defendants authorized by
DOJ for a capital prosecution, and a mere 2% of defendants who allegedly
committed a capital-eligible crime.68
A. FEDERAL CAPITAL DEFENSE

Outside of capital defense circles, little is known about the process of
appointing and supporting attorneys who represent federal capital
defendants. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3005, defendants charged with a federal
capital-eligible crime are entitled to two attorneys, at least one of whom is

61

Rory Little, The Federal Death Penalty: History and Some Thoughts About the
Department of Justice’s Role, 3 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347, 350 (1998). For a historical reference,
see HUGO ADAM BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 3 (1982).
62
GOULD & GREENMAN, supra note 14, at 4.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 85.
65
Id. at 7–8.
66
Id. at 10, 12.
67
Even that number includes two defendants sentenced to death by jurors but whose
sentences the trial judge overturned on a motion for a new trial. GOULD & GREENMAN, supra
note 12, at 10.
68
Id. at 12.
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required to be “learned in the law applicable to capital cases.”69 In practice,
because federal capital litigation is so extensive and expensive, virtually all
defendants qualify for the appointment of government-provided attorneys
under federal law.70 In some federal districts, the local federal public
defender’s office provides representation, but most capital defendants are
appointed a “panel attorney.”71 These lawyers, who are in private practice,
have agreed to take capital cases, for which they are selected and paid by the
presiding judge, who also determines the financial resources that will be
made available for the panel attorney’s defense efforts.72
Panel attorneys must submit vouchers for their time and that of any
assistants or experts they employ in the case, with judges reviewing the bills
and either approving or revising the amounts and services.73 Some courts
now employ case budgeting attorneys, who serve as intermediaries between
counsel and the court and also assist lawyers in creating a budget at the start
of the representation, which judges can then approve.74 The judge is the
arbiter in a variety of capacities; whether the attorney simply wishes to
employ a paralegal or investigator or needs to engage a forensic psychologist,
ballistics expert, or jury consultant for an aspect of the case, the categorical
request and financial amount must be presented to and approved by the
judge.75
The defense of death penalty cases is significantly more expensive than
for non-capital cases, and this applies to both state and federal proceedings.76
Examining cases from 1998-2004, the period during which the federal death
penalty was sought most often, federal defendants received a median $44,809
in attorney time and expert services to defend themselves in cases that were
capital-eligible but for which the Department of Justice did not seek the death
69

18 U.S.C. § 3005 (1994).
See 18 U.S.C § 3599 (2008) (providing counsel to indigent defendants in federal capital
cases).
71
Not only can capital cases overwhelm the caseload of a federal defender’s office
(“FDO”), but an FDO may have a conflict of interest with a co-defendant or not employ
lawyers who qualify for capital representation. Id.
72
GOULD & GREENMAN, supra note 12, at 17–18.
73
Id. at 59, 70.
74
Id. at 69–70.
75
Id. at 69.
76
While an exhaustive state-by-state overview is beyond the scope of this paper, in
Maryland alone, researchers at the Urban Institute found that among 1,000+ capital eligible
cases, the total cost of prosecuting averaged 1.9 million dollars more than a case in which the
death penalty was not sought. JOHN ROMAN ET AL., URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CENTER, THE
COST
OF
THE
DEATH
PENALTY
IN
MARYLAND
III
(Mar.
2008),
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/files/pdf/CostsDPMaryland.pdf; see also GOULD & GREENMAN,
supra note 12.
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penalty.77 By contrast, when the DOJ authorized a case for capital
prosecution, defense resources averaged $200,933 in cases completed by plea
and $465,602 for those resolved by trial.78 These differences are hardly
surprising. By virtue of the possible penalty at stake, capital cases warrant
greater attorney time and investigative effort. Moreover, a capital case
actually involves two trials.79 In the first, the parties litigate the guilt or
innocence of the defendant. Only if the defendant is convicted of a capital
charge does the trial move to the penalty or sentencing phase, in which the
prosecution seeks to explain why the defendant should be sentenced to death
while the defense presents mitigating evidence to convince jurors to deliver
a sentence of life without the possibility of release.80
B. DISPARITIES IN DEFENSE RESOURCES

To our knowledge, there have been only two national studies that have
examined the cost and quality of capital defense resources in the post-Federal
Death Penalty Act (“FDPA”) era. Both studies were commissioned by the
Committee on Defender Services of the Judicial Conference of the United
States.81 Although that second study was intended as an evaluation project,
it reached two conclusions that were both troubling and relevant for the
present study. Examining the attorney time and expert resources provided to
federal capital defendants at trial, the study found considerable regional
differences in the level of funds afforded defendants.82 Particular federal
districts, including those in Georgia, Texas, and North Carolina, were likely
to provide lower levels of defense support, while those in places like
Connecticut, California, and the District of Columbia afforded capital
defendants greater defense resources.83 Moreover, the level of support was
correlated with case outcomes and was statistically unrelated to the bulk of
77

GOULD & GREENMAN, supra note 12, at 84.
Id. at 25.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 77. See generally UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL
DEATH PENALTY SYSTEM: SUPPLEMENTARY DATA, ANALYSIS AND REVISED PROTOCOLS FOR
CAPITAL CASE REVIEW (Jun. 6, 2001), https://www.justice.gov/archive/dag/pubdoc/
deathpenaltystudy.htm.
81
See, e.g., James R. Spencer, Robin J. Cauthron & Nancy G. Edmunds, FEDERAL
DEATH PENALTY CASES: RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING THE COST AND QUALITY OF
DEFENSE REPRESENTATION (May 1998), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
uncategorized/Death_Penalty_Representation/Standards/National/federal_judicial_conferenc
e_recommendations.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Dec. 14, 2015); GOULD & GREENMAN,
supra note 12, at 51.
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the legally relevant facts of the case.84 As Table Two below indicates,
defendants whose approved funds were below the 30th percentile of support
(~ $320,000) were twice as likely to be sentenced to death as those with
higher levels of support.85
Table Two: Correlation between Defense Resources & Sentencing
Outcome
(statistically significant at .05 level)
Total Trial Cost

Sentenced to
Death

Other
Outcomes

Total
Cases

Lowest Resourced Cases
(< 30th percentile)

44%

56%

18

All Other Cases
(> 30th percentile)

19%

81%

43

These correlations should serve as a serious warning for those concerned
about the fairness of the federal death penalty. Certainly, on their face, the
correlations in Table Two suggest that defendants denied attorney time and
expert resources are at greater risk of being sentenced to death. However,
the field presently lacks sufficient data to move from correlational to causal
analysis—that is, to conclude definitively that cost reliably predicts case
outcome in capital trials. To draw this conclusion, of course, researchers
must account for both potential antecedent and intervening causes, such as
the strength of the evidence available to prosecutors or the demographics or
backgrounds of jurors. Neither we nor, to our knowledge, others possess
these data, and this point is revisited in the limitations section of the paper.
However, it is possible to assess the determinants of a defendant’s
resources at trial, those factors that influence how much attorney time and
expert assistance a suspect will receive when defending himself against a
death sentence. In this respect, we can analyze whether those bases reflect
legally relevant variables—for example, case complexity or a larger number
of victims, each of which would suggest higher cost defense—or extralegal
factors that should have no role predicting the level of a constitutionallyprotected service, for example, the race of the defendant or victim, or the
84
85

Id. at 47.
Id. at 44.
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background of the judge. After all, capital defense is safeguarded by the
Sixth Amendment,86 Supreme Court precedent,87 and federal statute.88 The
notion that defense resources would turn on extralegal or cultural factors is
antithetical to these legal norms and the legitimacy of the federal criminal
justice system itself, especially because the federal courts are considered a
unitary legal system in which the prevailing law, processes, and standards are
presumed to be common.89 Indeed, “the FDPA, the underlying congressional
intent regarding federal sentencing, and the Attorney General’s capital case
protocols, all indicate a policy of at least rough uniformity in the
administration of the federal death penalty.”90
In the remainder of this article, we analyze the decision to grant defense
resources in federal capital trials, seeking, first, to determine whether the
dividing line of low cost cases identified in Table Two is truly relevant and,
if so, to explain why certain cases are lower cost whereas others fall above
the 30th percentile. As explained in the next section, ours is an empirical
inquiry, involving cross-tabular, correlational, and regression analyses.
IV. DATA AND METHODS
Data on defense costs are available for federal defendants represented
by panel lawyers.91 Since these attorneys must file vouchers for their time
and the expenses of their investigators and experts, the courts are able to track
the resources provided and approved for the defense in these cases.92 Such
data are unavailable for cases involving public defenders, who do not track
or bill for their time, or for privately-retained attorneys, who need not share
their expenses with the court.93 However, because 80% of all federal capital
defendants have been represented by a panel attorney, information from
panel cases is informative for understanding the vast majority of federal

86

Bright, supra note 6, at 1836.
See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686–87 (1984) (establishing that the
Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant reasonably effective assistance of counsel);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–45 (1963) (holding that the Sixth Amendment’s
guarantee of counsel is a fundamental and essential right in a criminal case).
88
18 U.S.C. § 3005 (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 3599 (2008).
89
Little, supra note 61, at 350.
90
Id. at 452.
91
The Federal Defender Services Office maintains an electronic voucher and payment
system for panel attorneys.
See UNITED STATES COURTS, DEFENDER SERVICES	
  	
  
http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/defender-services (last visited Mar. 27, 2017).
92
GOULD & GREENMAN, supra note 12, at 119.
93
See REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT,
https://cjastudy.fd.org/ (forthcoming 2017).
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capital cases defended during this time period.94
We were able to obtain defense cost data for federal capital cases from
1998 to 2004.95 During this period, 214 defendants were charged with a
death-eligible crime and were appointed a panel attorney.96 The Department
of Justice sought the death penalty for half of the defendants (n = 95).97 As
noted in Figure One, our focus is the sixty-two defendants who went to trial;98
unlike unauthorized cases and pleas, defendants in these cases faced the real
prospect of a death sentence. Although we could not select the years of
available data, the period from 1998 to 2004 is an appropriate range,
capturing the modern federal death penalty at its apex.99 Whatever
procedures the federal courts used for the appointment and compensation of
panel attorneys, these measures would have been both implemented and
routinized by the years we now examine. For that matter, the hourly rate
permitted for panel attorneys was consistent across the years studied.100

94

GOULD & GREENMAN, supra note 12, at 19.
This information was legitimately provided to us on a confidential basis.
96
In addition, DOJ authorized another twenty-four capital cases that were handled at least
in part by a Federal Public Defender. Again, because cost data are unavailable for the work
done by federal public defenders, these cases are excluded from the analysis. See also GOULD
& GREENMAN, supra note 12, at 9.
97
See infra Figure One.
98
GOULD & GREENMAN, supra note 12, at 19.
99
Id. at 17.
100
UNITED STATES COURTS, DEFENDER SERVICES, APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL: THE
DEFENDER SERVICES PROGRAM, http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/defender-services
(last visited Feb. 21, 2016).
95

GOULD

10/10/17 5:43 PM

662

GOULD & LEON

[Vol. 107

Figure One: Distribution of Capital-Eligible Cases, 1998-2004
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A. DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Our dependent variable of interest is case cost, or the level of monetary
resources provided to federal capital defendants who were tried. This figure
is a combination of the time that defense lawyers dedicated to their clients’
cases as well as the amount of investigative and expert services that lawyers
employed as part of the defense. Case cost data are imperfect correlates for
attorney effort or expert time, as the total expenses are affected by both the
number of hours that each individual dedicated to the defense and his/her
hourly rate. However, at least in federal capital cases, attorneys’ hourly rates
are set at a maximum amount, $125 at the time in question.101 Attorneys may
bill at a lower hourly rate—which some junior lawyers did—but none may
bill higher than the hourly cap.102 A separate analysis, which includes
attorneys’ hours worked, shows the attorneys’ bills were an approximate
match for their hours worked,103 giving us confidence that the case cost data
are not skewed by differential hourly rates. Moreover, expert services
consistently constituted one-third of total defense costs across cases,
suggesting that we were seeing a common phenomenon and not one affected
by pockets of especially expensive or bargain expert rates.104 As such, the
101

Id.
Id.
103
Nor should this be surprising given that the hourly rate was capped at $125, an
extremely low figure given the stakes of a capital representation. Indeed, by 2010, the
maximum hourly rate for capital cases was $178/hour. GOULD & GREENMAN, supra note 12,
at 48.
104
In fact, informal conversations with federal capital defense lawyers suggest that there
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integrity of the case cost data was verified.	
  
A preliminary review of descriptive statistics shows significant
variation in the level of defense resources provided to federal capital
defendants. Within the sixty-two cases that proceeded to trial during the
period of this study, the median level of defense funds was $465,602.105 But,
as Table Three indicates, the maximum amount was $1,788,246, whereas the
lowest level was $67,366.106 The discrepancy between the median and mean
suggests that the latter is upwardly skewed by expensive outlier cases,
whereas the bulk of cases have costs much closer to the median. Cost drivers
and the mechanisms behind these differences are discussed in the Findings
section.	
  
Table Three: Total Cost for Defense Representation in Federal
Capital Cases, Panel Attorneys in Trials, 1998-2004	
  
	
  
Cases

Median

Mean

High

Low

Trials

$465,602

$620,932

$1,788,246

$67,366

B. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

We collected and tested six categories of independent variables against
defense resources, each representing different hypotheses for why federal
capital defendants received the levels and types of services to defend
themselves. These categories included Case Facts, Local Culture, Judge’s
Background, Defense Attorneys’ Experience, Court Performance, and
Defendant/Victim Demographics.	
  
1. Case Facts
We started with legally relevant factors—the facts of the case—which
might be said to comprise the “null hypothesis.” That is, if federal capital
defense is consistent with the constitutional, statutory, and common law
principles that protect due process and equal protection, we would expect
differences in defense resources to reflect the varying complexities of the
case facts, all of which would be legally-relevant variables. For example, a
is a “national market” for expert services, as defense teams often seek to rely on a few known
and trusted experts when their clients’ lives are at stake.
105
See infra Table Three.
106
Id.
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case that involves multiple co-defendants would require greater investigation
and preparation (which translates into higher defense resources and case
cost), as would a case in which a defendant is charged with multiple crimes
along with murder. Mass murders, too, carry an increased emotional impact,
which the defense must be prepared to counter at trial.	
  
Complex cases, therefore, are hypothesized to drive case cost upward.
Given available data, we collected and coded six variables that reflect case
complexity. These include the number of defendants, victims, and offenses;
the type of crime charged; the prosecution’s allegation of future
dangerousness; and the victim’s relative blamelessness. The first three of
these variables should be fairly self-explanatory in reflecting case
complexity. Put plainly, the more facts involved in a case, the broader
investigation needed and the greater defense resources required.	
  
The fourth variable separates cases with more complex charges,
specifically those involving a continuing criminal enterprise (“CCE”),
racketeer influenced corrupt organization (“RICO”), or terrorism—all of
which constitute either compound liability or multi-defendant cases.107
These more complicated charges stand in contrast to many other federal
capital cases, involving murders committed on federal lands or in federal
facilities or where a victim was transported across state lines. Although no
federal capital case is easy to defend, CCE, RICO, and terrorism cases
typically involve multiple locations and witnesses that require additional time
and personnel to investigate.108	
  
We also tracked whether the DOJ alleged the defendant’s future
dangerousness, a claim that prosecutors sometimes invoke as an “aggravating
circumstance” to justify a death sentence.109 To be sure, the prosecution may
be wrong about the defendant’s future dangerousness,110 but without access
to the defendants’ full criminal histories or a variable to assess the emotional
impact of the crimes charged, we used future dangerousness as a substitute
measure for the extra effort that the defense team must undertake to challenge
the prosecution’s argument for execution.	
  
Finally, the sixth component of case complexity is a dichotomous
variable denoting those crimes in which the targeted victim had no prior
criminal association connected to the case. Here, our intention was to
107

Susan W. Brenner, RICO, CCE, and Other Complex Crimes: The Transformation of
American Criminal Law?, 2 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 239, 241 (1993).
108
GOULD & GREENMAN, supra note 12, at 38.
109
See 18 U.S.C. § 3592 (2012) (discussing aggravating circumstances).
110
Mark D. Cunningham, Thomas J. Reidy & Jon R. Sorenson, Assertions of ‘Future
Dangerousness’ at Federal Capital Sentencing: Rates and Correlates of Subsequent Prison
Misconduct and Violence, 32 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 46, 50 (2007).
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separate those crimes involving especially sympathetic victims from those in
which the victim’s death may have been connected to his or her involvement
in criminal activity. This was done to account for the presence of many cases
in which the victim and defendant were known to one another or involved in
a similar trade or enterprise (e.g., organized crime or drug-related operation).
Although we recognize that capital defense lawyers routinely must soften the
jury’s impression of their clients, some cases take more effort than others.
Cases of the so-called “blameless victim” are among the most resourceintensive.111	
  
Our justification for these measures of case complexity lies, in part, in
the initial cross-tab examinations in Section V that highlight statistically
significant relationships between increased case cost and the case complexity
measures of interest. Although it is possible that in a given case one of the
complexity measures might be negatively correlated with case costs (as, for
example, if multiple co-defendants testified against one defendant), our
empirical assessments and previous literature connect our case complexity
measures with increased case cost.112 Conceptually, we believe that, in the
unique context of capital authorized federal cases, our measures of case
complexity are valid as they prolong and expand the steps needed to
successfully defend a case. Ideally, we would have included other factors
reflecting complex case facts, including the defendant’s intellectual
disability, the strength of the prosecution’s case, and the witnesses available
to the defense, among others. However, much of these data were either
unavailable or problematic.113 As a result, our analysis of case complexity is
confined to the six variables discussed above: Case Facts, Local Culture,
Judge’s Background, Defense Attorneys’ Experience, Court Performance,
and Defendant/Victim Demographics.	
  
2. Local Legal Culture
It is challenging to model variation in a multifaceted and abstract
concept like legal culture. Here, our operationalization of local legal culture
entails the direction and degree of punitiveness, which incorporates measures
of due process and crime control. Herbert Packer first articulated these
dueling motives, which reflect, on one hand, procedural safeguards to prevent
government overreach and, on the other hand, enhanced powers to speedily
111

GOULD & GREENMAN, supra note 12, at 48.
Id. at 37–38.
113
For example, no independent measure exists for a defendant’s mental ability, the only
marker being whether the defense employed a psychologist or psychiatrist and sought to
litigate the question at trial. But that then conflates independent and dependent variables,
which would confound the analysis.
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punish the guilty.114 We see these concepts debated regularly when officials
talk about preventing wrongful convictions or vindicating victims, and they
are evident also in debates about the appropriate level of defense
representation.115 Whenever people say that “a criminal defendant is entitled
to an adequate but not an extravagant defense”—and we have heard these
very words from judges—they are implicitly reflecting their preferred
balance between due process and crime control, at least with respect to
defense representation.116 These motives and competing objectives can be
measured, and we find that they vary across space (e.g., federal judicial
districts).	
  
Past research on punitiveness offers a few possible measures for local
variation, including regionally variant cultures of honor;117 political party
affiliation and measures of empathy;118 conservative values among a given
jurisdiction and the proportion of Republican seats in the jurisdiction’s
corresponding legislature;119 and religiosity.120 Ulmer & Johnson conducted
a series of hypothesis tests, one of which examined whether counties with
more conservative political electorates will exhibit more severe
sentencing.121 Their data did not support a connection between county-level
political climate and sentencing outcomes. Here, we were able to collect
three variables reflective of local punitiveness, including a) whether the death
penalty existed at the state level; b) voters’ support for the 2008 Republican
presidential candidate among the counties clustered within each federal
judicial district; and c) whether the federal judicial district was located in the
South (4th, 5th, and 11th federal circuits).122 Previous studies have found
114

HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 149–173 (1968).
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Craig Bowman, Indigent’s Right to an Adequate
Defense Expert and Investigational Assistance in Criminal Proceedings, 55 CORNELL L. REV.
632, 632 (1970); see also Fred W. Bennett, Toward Eliminating Bargain Basement Justice:
Providing Indigent Defendants with Expert Services and an Adequate Defense, 58 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 95, 95–98 (1995).
116
Based on confidential interviews.
117
Dov Cohen et al., Insult, Aggression, and the Southern Culture of Honor: An
“Experimental Ethnography”, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 945, 946 (1996).
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James Unnever, Francis T. Cullen & Bonnie S. Fisher, Empathy and Public Support
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James D. Unnever & Francis T. Cullen, White Perceptions of Whether African
Americans and Hispanics are Prone to Violence and Support for the Death Penalty, 49 J. RES.
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that all three of these variables are associated with increased capital sentences
at the state level.123 Given that members of federal courtroom workgroups
live and work in these same areas, they would hardly seem immune to the
socio-political cultures of their surrounding locales.	
  
3. Judges’ Backgrounds
There is considerable research suggesting that a judge’s background
affects the substance of her rulings.124 Here, we were able to collect three
variables reflective of a judge’s background, reputation, and style. First, we
coded the party affiliation of the president who appointed the judge, which
serves as a marker for the likely ideological bounds of the judge.125 Second,
we noted whether the judge had previously served as a federal prosecutor, a
variable reflective of her experience in federal criminal law and presumed
support for law enforcement and crime control strategies. Third, we coded
whether the judge had graduated from a nationally prestigious law school.126

to two circuits, the variable had the most explanatory power when accounting for the 4th, 5th,
and 11th Circuits.
123
John H. Beck et al., Regional Differences in Chapter 13 Filings: Southern Legal
Culture or Religion?, 72 REV. SOC. ECON. 186, 203 (2013); Cohen & Smith, supra note 26, at
433; Raymond Paternoster, Race of Victim and Location of Crime: The Decision to Seek the
Death Penalty in South Carolina, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 754, 779 (1983); Kleck,
supra note 6, at 794; Unnever & Cullen, supra note 120, at 531.
124
David Abrams, Marianna Bertran & Sendhil Mullainathan, Do Judges Vary in Their
Treatment of Race?, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 347, 377 (2012); Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley,
Myth of the Color-Blind Judge: An Empirical Analysis of Racial Harassment Cases, 86 WASH.
U. L. REV. 1117, 1156 (2008); Jonathan P. Kastellec, Racial Diversity and Judicial Influence
on Appellate Courts, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 167, 179 (2013); Stuart S. Nagel, Judicial
Backgrounds and Criminal Cases, 53 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 333, 339
(1962); Jennifer L. Peresie, Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in
the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759, 1786 (2005). See generally KITTY
CALAVITA, INVITATION TO LAW & SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF REAL LAW
(2010); ANTONIN SCALIA, INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONAL TEXTS, ARGUING ABOUT LAW
(Aileen Kavanagh & John Oberdiek eds., 2009).
125
We are well aware of the limits of this variable alone to predict a judge’s ideology,
particularly at the district court level. CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 3–4 (2006); Michael W. Giles, Virginia A.
Hettinger & Todd Peppers, Picking Federal Judges: A Note on Policy and Partisan Selection
Agendas, 54 POL. RES. Q. 623, 624–27 (2001). However, there is broad consensus that a
president’s political affiliation restricts the range of ideologies that would be considered
acceptable among individuals appointed to the federal bench. Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D.
Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of US Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
557, 558 (1989); Albert Yoon, Pensions, Politics, and Judicial Tenure: An Empirical Study of
Federal Judges, 1869–2002, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 143, 148 (2006).
126
Using a dichotomous variable distinguishing between the 15 highest ranked law
schools as measured by U.S. News and World Report.
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This last measure helps us in modeling a judge’s acculturation to national
legal norms and best practices. Imperfect as this variable may be,127 we have
heard from multiple lawyers who complain of parochial judicial attitudes,
which they contrast with judges who look to “national standards” for legal
practice.	
  
4. Defense Attorneys’ Experiences
The Gould and Greenman study linked the level of defense funds in
capital trials to the experience of the defenses lawyers involved.128 There,
the research team recruited a panel of distinguished lawyers experienced in
federal capital litigation and asked them to assess the level of experience of
the lawyers represented in the dataset.129 Further, because the expert panel
also was acquainted with many of the cases, researchers asked them to assess
whether the attorneys had first been recommended for appointment by the
local federal public defender or the Administrative Office of the United
States, as required by federal statute.130	
  
We have borrowed those same assessments for the present study and
have added a third variable that reflects an attorney’s years of legal
experience following graduation from law school. Hence, our three variables
for defense representation include an objective measure of years of
experience, subjective evaluations of legal competence by distinguished
peers, and an estimate for whether knowledgeable actors had recommended
the attorneys for appointment. Based on the prior work of Gould and
Greenman, we predict that cases in which lawyers who have a long career,
are well-respected by their peers and who were recommended by
knowledgeable actors will have higher defense resources.131 That is,
experienced and respected capital defense lawyers will be more likely to
advocate zealously for the resources needed for an effective defense and will
feel less bound by a local legal culture that might accept a lower level of
effort.	
  
127

The most compelling variable would ask judges to identify the norms or standards they
seek to follow, but the expense and feasibility of such a survey are prohibitive. Instead, we
borrow from prior research on regional accents, which finds that young people unconsciously
adopt or eschew regional accents in their late teens or early twenties, which “is usually the
time we come to some sort of decision about who we are.” Anthea Fraser Gupta, Accents,
http://linguistlist.org/ask-ling/accent.cfm#reading (last visited Feb. 17, 2016). Similarly, a
budding lawyer who chooses to attend a nationally prestigious law school is at least
subconsciously identifying with national legal norms and practices.
128
GOULD & GREENMAN, supra note 12, at 24–26.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id. at 66–68.
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5. Court Performance
Median felony disposition time and the number of felony filings per
judge are used independently to model court performance and how busy the
courts are within each federal judicial district. These variables help control
for “backlog effects,” or the possibility that fewer resources are allocated to
capital cases because the courtroom workgroup and other legal actors are
burdened with heavy caseloads and, thus, do not spend significant time on
any criminal case. Alternatively, a culture of rapid case processing (e.g., a
“rocket docket” effect) may be operating across all criminal cases if felony
disposition times are short, independent of felony filings per judge.132 In
these districts, it would not be surprising if defense resources were reduced
across all criminal cases, not just capital representations. To account for
these possibilities, we pulled data from Federal Court Management Statistics,
maintained by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, reflecting
caseloads and case processing times.133 The number of pending cases per
judge, criminal felony filings per judge, and the median times for both felony
and civil disposition were averaged across a five-year period to allow for a
cross-sectional comparison across all federal judicial districts.	
  
6. Defendant/Victim Demographics
Finally, we included dichotomous variables for race and ethnicity to
verify whether prior findings that link race to capital sentences also prove
true for defense resources.134 To simplify the analysis (and to be consistent
with those prior findings), we included three dichotomous variables: whether
the defendant is black,135 whether any victim was white, and whether any
victim was white and the defendant non-white. Because two of these
variables are, by definition, collinear, we tested them separately.	
  

132

Tracy Bach, To Expediency and Beyond: Vermont’s Rocket Docket, 4 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 277, 280 (2002); Carrie E. Johnson, Rocket Dockets: Reducing Delay in Federal
Civil Litigation, 85 CAL. L. REV. 225, 227 (1997).
133
See generally U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT STATISTICS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/analysis-reports/federal-court-managementstatistics. Because such data were not publicly available for the late 1990s, we drew them from
the earliest available period, 2009-2013.
134
LANIER, supra note 16, at 1155.
135
African-Americans constituted a substantial majority of defendants in the dataset,
compared to just 24% of whites and 14% of Hispanics. The comparison of African-American
defendants to other races/ethnicities was statistically more powerful than other constructions
(i.e., white vs. non-white defendants, etc.). We followed this same approach for the other two
race variables.
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C. QUANTILE REGRESSION AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF “HIGH-” AND
“LOW-COST” CASES

Initially, we estimated the effects of the independent variables on total
defense cost, asking whether local punitive culture (or the other independent
factors noted above) are associated with the total level of defense resources
provided in federal capital trials. None of these variables had a statically
significant effect. However, in graphing total defense cost, we noticed two
plateaus in the distribution, one high and the other low. We, thus, explored
the feasibility of a quantile regression, assessing whether the explanatory
variables have different magnitudes of effect across the range of total case
cost.136	
  
Quantile regression allows us to examine a question that linear
regression cannot: does local punitive culture have a different effect on lowcost versus high-cost cases? In other words, does the effect of local punitive
culture (and other hypothesized predictors) vary throughout the distribution
of total case cost? As is the convention, quantile regression is used to
delineate cut points—a case-cost floor and/or ceiling—to understand what
range of cases may be most affected by our hypothesized explanatory
variables.137 For this analysis, we employed decile quantile regression,
examining the relationship between the explanatory variables at each decile
(or 1/10th) of the case-cost distribution (in dollars).	
  
Quantile regression was appropriate and suggested two powerful
divisions in the data—the 80th and 30th deciles of the case-cost
distribution.138 These deciles were selected on the conventional basis of
observing the variation in the magnitudes of the coefficient estimates at each
decile of the dependent variable’s distribution. The 30th and 80th decile of
the case-cost distribution showed significant magnitude and/or directional
changes in the relationship between the independent variables in our model
and the case-cost outcome. This gives us confidence that they are important
for understanding which cases are most likely to be affected by the allocation
of defense resources. These cut points make conceptual sense as well,
reflecting what might be understood as “ceilings” and “floors” in the data,
and matching what we noticed in the graph of total defense cost. That is,
136

See generally LINGXIN HAO & DANIEL Q. NAIMAN, QUANTILE REGRESSION (2007);
Roger Koenker & Kevin F. Hallock, Quantile Regression, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 143 (2001).
137
The quantile regression estimation equation is: yTotalCaseCost = βo(p) + β1(p) Local Legal Culture
(p)
+ β2 JudgeTenure + β3(p) AttorneyQuality + βk(p) False.(controls) + εi(p) where super-script (p) indicates that
coefficient estimates will vary at each specified quantile level (p). In this study, we employed
decile quantile regression, examining the relationship between the explanatory variables at
each decile of the case-cost distribution.
138
Respectively, these cut points were $891,266 and $313,859.
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representations over the 80th percentile might be understood as “high-cost
cases,” whereas those under the 30th percentile could be considered “lowcost.”	
  
We went beyond quantile regression to better understand what factors
predicted high-cost representations. In a logistic regression using the 80th
percentile as the dependent variable—that is, predicting whether defense
costs would be above or below the upper quintile—the results were
surprisingly straightforward, suggesting that the complexity of case facts
helped explain the highest-cost cases. This is as we might expect: the most
complex fact patterns require the greatest defense effort, both in terms of time
and personnel involved, and, thus, are likely to account for the bulk of the
most expensive representations.	
  
D. HYPOTHESES FOR LOWER-COST CASES

However, the division between low-cost and all other capital
representations was much more complicated, turning both on local legal
culture and many of the other independent variables described above. We
approached this puzzle systematically, utilizing eight hypotheses to explore
why defense resources would fall below the 30th percentile—below the
floor—in federal capital trials.	
  
We begin with a null hypothesis, H0, which focuses on legally relevant
factors, primarily the complexity of case facts. Here, we hypothesize that
cases with the least complicated facts would be associated with defense
resources below the 30th percentile. Again, this is a fairly straight-forward
prediction: as case facts become more complex, defense attorneys and their
staff must spend more time—and bill additional time—investigating the
facts, and they may need to hire additional experts as well.	
  
From there, our hypotheses look to other elements of the case as
reflected in the independent variables we collected:	
  
H1: Cases in judicial districts with more punitive local legal cultures
will be more likely to fall below the 30th percentile for defense resources.
Just as members of the public in more punitive areas may seek strict and swift
punishment, we hypothesize that judges and other members of the courtroom
working group in these districts may be reluctant to tolerate or permit an
extensive defense.	
  
H2: Cases in which the presiding judge was appointed by a Republican
president, previously served as a federal prosecutor, and graduated from a
less nationally recognized law school will be more likely to be below the 30th
percentile for defense resources. Here, we expect that judges with a more
conservative orientation, who previously sought criminal convictions, and
who may not have been acculturated to national norms of defense
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representation will be reluctant to grant substantial resources to the defense.	
  
H3: Cases in which the defense lawyers have considerable legal
experience, are recognized by their peers as highly qualified, and were
recommended for appointment by the federal public defender or the
Administrative Office of the Courts are more likely to be above the 30th
percentile for defense resources. Following on Bright’s argument that the
death penalty is reserved for defendants with “the worst lawyer,” this
hypothesis assumes that defense lawyers with stronger credentials will spend
more time preparing a defense and solicit more expert assistance to represent
their clients.139	
  
H4: Faster felony disposition time will be associated with an increased
likelihood that cases fall below the 30th percentile for defense resources. As
may be true of all criminal defendants in so-called “rocket dockets,” we
hypothesize that defendants charged in faster districts will face heightened
pressure to move the case along, which in turn may limit defense effort.	
  
H5: Increases in felony filings per judge will be associated with the case
falling below the 30th percentile for defense resources. Similar to the
hypothesis immediately above, we expect that judges overwhelmed with
felony filings will be reluctant to grant defense teams additional investigative
resources or preparation time, which could slow down the movement of the
case and, in turn, further clog the judge’s docket.	
  
H6: Being an African-American defendant will be associated with fewer
defense resources. Just as prior research finds that African-American
defendants face a greater risk of a death sentence, we expect that a similar
phenomenon will prove true for defense resources.	
  
H7: The presence of a white victim will result in defense resources that
fall below the 30th percentile. Cases in which a victim is white are associated
with greater public outcry and pressure to speed the case along to a conviction
and sentence.140 In turn, we hypothesize that defendants in these cases are
likely to see their available resources fall below the 30th percentile. A
corollary to this hypothesis presumes that the effect will be greatest when the
victim is white and the defendant is not. Researchers have postulated for
decades that the criminal justice system assigns greater value to white than
black life,141 and we expect that will prove true as well in capital defense.	
  

139

Bright, supra note 6, at 1883.
Chris Greer, News Media, Victims and Crime, in VICTIMS, CRIME AND SOCIETY
(Pamela Davies et al. eds., 2007).
141
See, e.g., DAVID BALDUS, GEORGE WOODWORTH & CHARLES A. PULASKI, JR., EQUAL
JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 140–197 (1990).
140
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ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

We tested these hypotheses initially using bivariate analysis to examine
the relationships between the respective independent variables and low
defense resources (as represented by the 30th percentile of the defense cost
distribution). Table Four below presents the results from cross-tabular and
correlational analyses. Overall, six of our seven hypotheses found
preliminary support in these tests, as did one aspect of the null hypothesis.	
  
Beginning with the null hypothesis—that low-cost defense is explained
by “simpler” case facts—just one of the six possible independent variables
showed statistical significance. Whereas low defense resources do not
appear connected to the number of defendants, victims, or offenses in a case,
the potential future dangerousness of the defendant, or a victim who was
involved in criminal activity, there is an initial link between the complexity
of the charge and the resources provided to the defense. Defendants charged
with a continuing criminal enterprise, terrorism, or RICO offense were likely
to receive higher defense resources, whereas individuals facing other capital
charges were three times as likely to be in the low-cost category.	
  
This last finding makes intuitive sense, in that complex charges require
more thorough investigation, including witnesses who may reside in other
districts or even outside the U.S. However, it is instructive that none of the
other variables reflecting the null hypothesis showed significant statistical
promise. This is significantly different than the high-cost cases, where the
most complex facts required the greatest defense effort and thus cost the most
to defend. By contrast, the lowest-cost representations are not concentrated
among cases with the least complicated facts, at least insofar as complexity
is measured by the number of defendants, victims, or offenses involved or
the nature of the victim or defendant. To the extent that the null hypothesis
has explanatory power—that legally cognizable factors explain lower-cost
capital defense—it seems limited to the complexity of the charge.
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Table Four: Bivariate Correlations or Cross-Tabulations for	
  
Factors Associated with Low-Cost Cases	
  
(< 30th percentile of defense cost distribution)

Category

Variable

Case Facts

Number of defendants
Number of victims
Number of offenses

Local Culture
Court Performance
Judge Factors

Defense Attorney

Race

CCE/RICO/Terrorism
Future Dangerousness
Uninvolved Victim
State w/ Death Penalty
GOP vote > 50%
South (4th, 5th, 11th circuit)
Criminal filings per judge
Felony disposition time
Former Federal Prosecutor
Top 15 Law School Grad
Appointed by Republican
President
Distinguished experience
Recommended for
Appointment
Years of practice
Black Defendant
White Victim
White Victim w/ Non-White
Defendant

Low
Cost
.04
.154
.178
21%
63%
55%
95%
72%
74%
.466
.434
6%
6%
65%

Other
Cases
——-

P Values

—-

.16

60%
70%
40%
72%
36%
30%
——-

.005
.60
.33
.04
.009
.001
.001
.001

32%
48%
28%

.03
.003
.23

47%
29%

76%
69%

.02
.006

.154
79%
37%
32%

—-

.33

47%
49%
19%

.01
.38
.26

.75
.23

Our other hypotheses showed greater promise in the cross-tabular and
correlational analyses. Our primary hypothesis of interest—punitive legal
culture—appears strongly predictive in bivariate testing. Here, the three
independent variables suggest that capital defendants face a greater
likelihood of a lower-cost defense when tried in conservative areas,
especially the South, which have greater attachment to the death penalty. As
we posited earlier, conservative, more punitive areas are likely to value crime
control over due process. It is not surprising, then, that capital defendants—
individuals tried for the most serious and often most heinous crimes—receive
fewer resources to defend themselves and protect their liberties in those
judicial districts in which the courtroom workgroups operate within and
among these prevailing views.	
  
The overall speed and workload of the courts were also linked to defense
resources. As hypothesized, defendants tried in courts with higher caseloads
and faster disposition times received the fewest resources for their defense.
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These findings could be indicative of a “rocket docket” effect, in which
defense effort is limited as cases are pushed through the system. Or, with a
heightened caseload in these districts, judges might be reluctant to grant
defendants extra time and resources to investigate matters as additional
filings pile up. Indeed, it is possible that caseload and processing speed are
related, with greater filings forcing quicker disposition time. Of course, this
is another way of saying that defendants tried in jurisdictions with higher
caseloads and faster disposition times receive shorter attention to their cases,
and it is hardly a jump in logic to imagine that the pressure to speed up case
processing creates a culture in which defense teams are encouraged—or must
accept the expectation—to devote less time and effort to the representation.	
  
The experience and reputation of defense attorneys were also associated
with the court’s allocation of resources to their clients’ defense. As
hypothesized, defense lawyers lacking “illustrious” experience in capital
representation typically mounted the least costly defenses, as were lawyers
whose appointment to the case was not recommended by the local federal
public defender or the Office of Defender Services. However, a lawyer’s
total years of practice were not associated with defense resources at trial.
These results support the notion that capital defense is a specialized field, one
in which those possessing focused and distinguished experience are able to
devote greater time to cases and/or secure additional expert assistance in
investigating cases and representing their clients.	
  
Similarly, the background of the presiding judge was related to defense
resources, although not necessarily as we predicted. We hypothesized that a
judge’s ideology would affect his willingness to approve defense funds,
although this relationship failed to reach statistical significance in the
bivariate tests. Of course, this finding may reflect a limitation in our data, as
we were forced to employ a blunt variable that coded the partisan affiliation
of the judge’s appointing president rather than other measures that might
have assessed the judge’s past voting or contribution patterns. That said, the
bivariate relationships suggest a relationship between defense resources and
the national prominence of the judge’s law school as well as the judge’s past
service as a federal prosecutor. Judges who attended a nationally recognized
law school were much less likely to have been involved in lower-cost cases,
as were judges who had previously served as federal prosecutors.	
  
We predicted that both of these variables would connect to defense
resources, although we had the direction of the latter relationship wrong. It
turns out that judges who previously served as federal prosecutors were
unlikely to be involved in low-cost cases. Rather than limiting defense
resources, perhaps these judges recall the multiple resources they had at their
disposal to litigate cases as federal prosecutors and may support and even
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encourage capital defense lawyers to conduct thorough investigations and
engage relevant experts.	
  
Finally, only part of our hypotheses about the relationship of the
defendant’s and victim’s races proved valid. As the bivariate relationships
indicate, the victim’s race, whether on its own or in relationship to that of the
defendant, was not statistically connected to defense cost. However, the race
of the defendant was statistically significant, as African-Americans were
almost 1.7 times more likely than other defendants to receive a lower-cost
defense. This result is consistent with other research on the death penalty,
which finds African-Americans are at greater risk of worse treatment and
outcomes142 and also in line with scholars who contend that individuals
holding less social power—as measured by race, gender, and socio-economic
standing—receive fewer government resources and legal protections than
those “valued” more highly.143 Indeed, the recent rise of the Black Lives
Matter movement is a reminder that, historically and presently, AfricanAmericans have been treated by the criminal justice system as though they
were less important than whites.144 If so, it would follow that, all things being
equal, the defense resources devoted to a capital case when the defendant is
black would be lower than when the defendant is white.	
  
We also employed regression analysis to determine whether the
bivariate correlations hold up in multivariate testing. Given the small number
of cases in our sample, we used factor analysis to reduce the number of
independent variables, creating single variables that represented local culture,
judge’s background, and defense attorneys’ experience and reputation.145
Along with these, we included existing variables reflective of the complexity
of the charge, median felony disposition time, felony caseload, and race of
the defendant and that of the victim.	
  
Given our unconventionally small sample size (n < 100), we turned to
Bayesian estimation to explore the statistical relationships between the
independent variables and low defense resources.146 Mirroring the results of
142

Id. at 625.
DONALD BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF LAW 21 (1976).
144
Nicole D. Porter, Expanding Public Safety in the Era of Black Lives Matter, 70 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 533, 548 (2016). See generally Juliet Hooker, Black Lives Matter and the
Paradoxes of U.S. Black Politics: From Democratic Sacrifice to Democratic Repair, 44 POL.
THEORY 448 (2016).
145
RAYMOND CATTELL, THE SCIENTIFIC USE OF FACTOR ANALYSIS IN THE BEHAVIORAL
AND LIFE SCIENCES 52–71 (1978).
146
The conventional approach to estimating regression models with a binary dependent
variable is the multivariate logit model. However, logit models rely on maximum-likelihood
estimation (“MLE”). MLE is based on large-sample theory, and it often performs poorly with
small samples. Bayesian regression models are known to perform more reliably with small
143
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the bivariate analysis, two independent variables were statistically significant
at a confidence level of 95% and in the same direction as hypothesized. As
Table Five below indicates, cases involving less complex charges and those
tried by judges with packed dockets were likely to receive the lowest level of
defense support. The first of these results may be of comfort to the courts,
reflecting as it does a legally cognizable explanation for the provisioning of
defense resources. Yet, even if complex charges are unlikely to render a lowcost defense, the converse need not necessarily be true, for even a so-called
“simple” charge can necessitate extensive defense effort. But at least as we
hypothesized, defendants charged with the most complex charges were
unlikely to be at the lowest level of defense resources.	
  
Still, four other variables were within or at the cusp of statistical
significance in the regression147 and raise questions about the distribution of
defense resources. As we hypothesized, defense resources were at the lowest
level when cases were tried in a more punitive local culture, by a judge
educated at a less prestigious law school, in a court with a faster docket, and
when the defendant was African-American.	
  
In fact, only two independent variables did not perform in the regression
as they had in the bivariate tests. Because other research has linked victim’s
race to capital sentencing, we included the variable in the regression even
though it had performed marginally at best in the cross-tabs on defense
costs.148 The prior research proved prescient, as the variable showed strong
significance in the regression. Here, cases in which none of the victims were
white received the lowest level of defense resources. At the same time, the
composite variable for defense team experience dropped from statistical
significance in the regression. When controlling for the other variables in the
Bayesian estimation, a defendant’s level of resources did not turn on the level
samples, and thus, we rely on Bayesian estimation procedures here. More specifically, we
employed a Bayesian estimator in Mplus using the Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm.
Simulation research has shown this estimator performs well with small samples relative to
other estimation procedures. Tihomir Asparouhov & Bengt Muthén, Bayesian Analysis of
Latent Variable Models Using Mplus, Version 4, 24 (Sept. 29, 2010)
http://www.statmodel.com/download/BayesAdvantages18.pdf. Table Five, then, presents
standardized regression coefficients based on Bayesian estimates for the model.
147
In saying this, we recognize that we are including some variables whose p values were
between .05 and .1. We do not mean to over-claim. But, because these relationships are close
to .05 even with a small sample, because those p values are based on a one-tailed distribution,
and because the regression results mirror those of the bivariate relationships that more than
met statistical significance, we feel comfortable making these claims. See generally Roger
Wasserstein & Nicole Lazar, The ASA’s Statement on P-Values: Context, Process, and
Purpose, 70 AM. STATISTICIAN 129 (2016).
148
Because there were not sufficient cases in each category of the variable, we could not
test the relationship between the race of the victim and defendant in the regression.
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of experience or professional reputation of his lawyers.	
  
	
  
Table Five: Standardized Bayesian Estimation of Defense
Resources	
  
(DV = 30% Threshold. N =64)	
  
	
  
Variable

Estimate

P (one-tailed)

. 012
-.011
.005
-.481
.471
-.103

Standard
Deviation
.082
.087
.067
.201
.184
.073

Local Culture Factor
Judge Factor
Attorney Factor
Complex Charge
Felony Filings/Judge
Felony Disposition
Time
Defendant Black
Any Victim White

.094
-.123

.075
.071

.08
.02

.05
.07
.46
.02
.01
.06

VI. DISCUSSION
This last finding—that the level of resources a defendant received at a
capital trial was not explained by the experience or reputation of the defense
attorneys—seems, at first, surprising. However, we must revisit the bivariate
relationships to understand what it means. The regression results do not
suggest that a lawyer’s experience and professional esteem are unrelated to
the level of defense resources his client receives at trial, for the cross-tabs in
Table Four show that lower-cost defenses are concentrated among defendants
whose lawyers were neither recommended for appointment nor considered
especially qualified by their colleagues. However, this relationship is not
causal, as the statistical significance drops precipitously in the regression
equation. It would seem, then, that at least one of the other independent
variables explains the correlation between attorney experience and defense
cost. Or, put more simply, one or more of the independent variables
determines the type of attorney appointed, which is then correlated with the
level of resources the client receives.	
  
This explanation makes intuitive sense given that attorney experience
and reputation are linked to the other independent variables in separate
bivariate tests. As Table Six below indicates, these relationships follow the
same patterns as those found for defense resources, with experienced and
esteemed lawyers less likely to be appointed in conservative or punitive
jurisdictions, by judges appointed by Republican presidents who did not
attend the most prestigious law schools and in judicial districts with heavy
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felony caseloads disposed of quickly. That African-American defendants
were least likely to receive top-quality lawyers is unfortunately consistent
with a host of other research on the death penalty.149	
  
	
  
Table Six: Bivariate Relationships Between Attorney Experience
and Recommendation and Other Independent Variables	
  
	
  
Variable

Lawyer
Experienced

Lawyer
Not

P
Value

Lawyer
Recommended

Lawyer
Not

P
Value

State has Death
Penalty
GOP vote >
50%
South
Judge appointed
by Repub.
President
Judge former
Federal
Prosecutor
Judge Top 15
Law School
Grad
Felony Filings
Per Judge
Felony
Disposition
Time
Defendant is
Black
White Victim
Complex
Charge

73%

90%

.13

69%

88%

.1

33%

70%

.01

17%

75%

.01

34%
40%

65%
75%

.02
.01

16%
45%

71%
65%

.01
.14

30%

15%

.21

31%

22%

.45

46%

15%

.02

48%

17%

.02

-.395

——

.01

-.355

—-

.01

.251

——

.06

.537

—-

.01

49%

75%

.05

50%

79%

.02

41%
54%

50%
35%

.52
.17

38%
56%

46%
38%

.53
.16

Together, the bivariate and regression results paint a larger picture in
which the forces that affect the type of attorney appointed in capital cases
also influence the level of representation that a defendant receives in a capital
trial. In specific districts—those in more punitive areas, presided over by
judges educated at less prestigious law schools, where the criminal dockets
are busy or judges are willing to process cases hurriedly—capital defendants
149
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are unlikely to receive the most capable or experienced lawyers, and defense
effort, in turn, is likely to fall below the thirtieth percentile of resources. That
African-Americans disproportionately bear this brunt, whether as defendants
or in cases in which the victims are predominantly racial minorities, is alltoo-familiar in the history of American capital punishment.	
  
Why would this be so? There have been hints at explanations from
federal practitioners. Shortly before he left the federal bench, Judge John
Gleeson from the Eastern District of New York (Brooklyn) testified that
“there are too many districts in which panel attorneys virtually never seek
funding for investigations or experts. As I understand the problem from
speaking to defenders and panel attorneys around the country . . . it is a
cultural understanding that they simply won’t be sought.”150 Other judges and
lawyers have told us informally that they believe there are “capital defense
deserts” across the federal districts in which “the local culture just doesn’t
support the same level of practice as elsewhere.”151	
  
To be sure, “capital defense deserts” may be as reflective of lawyers who
do not seek resources as judges who do not grant them.152 Our intent is less
to pinpoint individual responsibility as it is to establish that those deserts exist
and that local legal culture, even in a unified federal system, influences the
level of representation a capital defendant will receive. To explore this point,
we shared a summary of the results from Tables Four, Five, and Six with a
panel of federal defense lawyers and judges to gauge their interpretation. The
group numbered seven lawyers and five judges, each of whom had significant
experience in federal capital cases and who agreed to speak with us on the
condition of anonymity. None of the participants was told of the others’
involvement, and we did not share responses in order to avoid bias. We do
not claim that the group is representative of federal practitioners or judges,
though the twelve come from diverse geographic areas and, in our judgment,
are thoughtful on the subject. Our intent in speaking with them was to test the
plausibility of our interpretation of the quantitative data, especially in light of
Judge Gleeson’s testimony and the other scattered but informal reports we had
heard.	
  
Collectively, the group not only supported our potential explanation but,
with the protection of anonymity, was willing to go beyond Gleeson’s
account. As one lawyer explained, “Of course, this is about culture.” He
150

John Gleeson, Testimony to the Ad Hoc Committee to Review the Criminal Justice Act
Program 9 (Jan. 12, 2016), https://cjastudy.fd.org/sites/default/files/hearing-archives/miamiflorida/pdf/johngleesonmiamiwritten-testimony-done.pdf.
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continued:	
  
How many times have we heard judges talk about providing a Chevrolet but
not a Cadillac defense to defendants? That perspective affects so much of a
capital case. I’ve seen judges—who come from conservative state courts
where it’s assembly line justice—reach the federal bench but bring those
same attitudes with them. They appoint lawyers to cases who are reluctant
to challenge them or ask for multiple experts. The judges push the cases
along, which is what they did in state court. It’s no wonder that these cases
have lower payments. That’s a defense in name only.153
	
  
Others chimed in with similar explanations. One federal judge said,
“We know there are different geographic cultures in litigation.” He
continued:	
  
My colleagues in New York and Los Angeles repeatedly describe a ‘harder
hitting’ private bar in civil matters. Why wouldn’t we expect these
differences to extend to criminal cases? . . . Is it a chicken or an egg? I’m
not sure. But, whether the judge appoints a lawyer with whom he is more
comfortable, or lawyers just gravitate to places where they fit better, I’m
not surprised.154
	
  
We do not offer these responses as definitive evidence of their wide
support or as absolute proof that the accounts explain our data. But, they do
lend greater credence to a unifying theory of local legal culture to explain the
disparate level of defense resources in federal capital trials. Even in a small
sample of cases, the regression results identified multiple factors as
predictive of lower-cost defense, and many of those variables hold together
under a theory of divergent legal culture.	
  
Yet, even if the results are not indicative of a larger cultural explanation,
they show that a single practice within a unitary court system is implemented
with tremendous variation, both in terms of geography and other factors not
delineated by law. This is not the same as saying that the provision of defense
resources in federal capital cases is arbitrary. Actually, our results show
systemic and systematic differences in defense resources, variation that can
be linked to specific, identifiable influences in a closed legal system. It is
worth remembering that the federal death penalty is authorized under a single
chapter of the United States code, and it is litigated through a common set of
153
154
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procedures. Whereas states vary considerably in authorizing the death
penalty and appointing and compensating defense lawyers,155 federal courts
are ostensibly bound by a common set of statutes and practices.156 Federal
law does not mean one thing in Oregon and another thing in Louisiana, for
example. Even if we accept some inevitable variation in circuit practices, it
is not clear why in capital cases—a matter clearly evoking the Sixth, Eighth,
and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution—there should be such
great variation in the level of defense afforded capital defendants, especially
when those under an identifiable floor of support are at greater risk of being
sentenced to death.	
  
To be sure, the connection between defense resources and capital
sentencing is correlative, not causal. But, with few exceptions, none of the
independent causes identified in this study is legally cognizable in setting the
level of defense representation at a capital trial. Under the Criminal Justice
Act and clarifying Guide to Judiciary Policy, judges are instructed to
authorize attorney and expert time for indigent defendants facing capital
charges.157 Nowhere in those rules are judges called to differentiate based on
the caseloads they face, the political climate of the states in which they work,
or even more, the race of the defendant or the victim before them. Indeed,
there is only one independent variable in the regression that would be a
legally acceptable factor in setting defense resources—the complexity of the
capital charge. Here, at least, the results are as we might expect—defendants
charged with more serious charges are unlikely to fall into the lowest
category of defense resources.	
  
There is a ready analogy among our findings to past research on the
effect of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.158 In those studies, scholars
found significant geographic disparities in sentencing patterns even when the
Guidelines were in effect and presumably prescribed a narrow and consistent
range of sentences for a given set of crimes committed by defendants with
155

David Baldus, Charles Pulaski, Jr. & George Woodworth, Arbitrariness and
Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: A Challenge to State Supreme
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similar criminal histories. To some researchers, geographic variation itself
was proof of an unstated but powerful extralegal standard at play,159 while
others examined geographic differences in particular sentencing practices,
which they said could reflect “local implementation strategies at odds with
national strategy.”160	
  
As one scholar has noted, the “sentencing guidelines [were] premised
on the view that criminals do have some claim to equal treatment.”161 That
argument applies as well here, but the findings in our study are different in
two important respects. First, they concern the ability of a defendant to put
on an effective defense—which, by definition, is the very time in the criminal
justice process in which the defendant is presumed to be an innocent suspect,
not a guilty criminal. Second, although some of the sentencing research
addressed differential effects of the guidelines,162 our work addresses the
likely sources of differential defense resources, sources that are, themselves,
largely extralegal.	
  
In a broader socio-legal context, this study highlights an assumption in
some legal pluralism literature. Whereas conventional legal pluralism
scholarship highlights the effects of inter-jurisdictional overlap (betweengroup differences), and the effects of multiple legal and law-like systems on
social behavior,163 we find within-group differences at a commonjurisdictional level. Rather than comparing between distinctive death penalty
processes in a federalist system (e.g., state-specific versus federal death
penalty administrations), we examine how processes vary within a single
system that is assumed to be uniform and consistent across space and across
courtroom workgroup actors and agents. Thus, unlike Cover—who prefers
the “messy federalism” of differing state and federal court practices164—our
findings are more in keeping with Garland’s conclusions about legal
pluralism.165 To be sure, Garland was discussing the lawlessness of
lynchings in the early twentieth century, whereas we have examined a formal
legal process nearly a century later, but there are parallels in Garland’s
159
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account that “community norms and the rules of state law competed for”
control of the community.166 In Garland’s study, vigilante practices “were
not . . . liable to be sanctioned,” because, while “violat[ing] the letter of state
law,” they did not contradict “group norms” of the local community.167 In
our work, the presumed consistency of a unitary federal system gives way to
a “messier” picture168 “of conflicting powers and multiple authorities”169 that
create place-specific differences in life-or-death matters.	
  
We are not prepared in an article of this scope to address the
constitutional implications of our results for, among other things, our intent
is not prescriptive. For now, we seek to address the influence of local legal
culture in the provision of defense resources and that effect on federal capital
litigation as a whole. Relying on the findings from both the frequentist and
Bayesian analyses, we find that much of the decision to limit defense
resources is explained by extralegal factors, including the attributes of the
judge, the geographic placement of the federal judicial district and its
surrounding punitive legal culture, and the nature of caseloads and case
processing times in the district. Only the complexity of the underlying charge
presents an explanation in line with the null hypothesis, although even here
none of the other variables reflecting case facts proved either correlative or
causative.	
  
VII. LIMITATIONS & CONCLUSION
There are multiple reasons to be modest in our claims. Econometric
modeling for this kind of data is challenging, due in part to the low statistical
power of estimating logistic regressions on a sample size of sixty-two cases
where only nineteen cases fall within the low-cost category of interest.
Furthermore, the absence of data on the strength of evidence in these cases
serves to reinforce the reminder that some of our findings are correlative and
not reflective of causal processes. Quantile and logistic regression on a
sample size smaller than 100 should be interpreted with extreme caution,
which is why we exhausted all possible avenues for supplementing and
corroborating findings stemming from this portion of the analysis. Our
Bayesian estimates (which are more fitting for small N studies) supported a
strong relationship between our independent variables and case cost, but still,
these findings are far from decisive on the question of whether and to what
extent the federal death penalty is problematically administered. Even with
166
167
168
169
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the expert interviews of federal judges and lawyers, we prefer to frame our
results not as decisive findings but as exploratory red flags that underscore
important follow-up questions regarding the integrity of the federal death
penalty’s administration.	
  
Elements of local punitive culture and subcultural behaviors of the
courtroom workgroup may be operating earlier in the litigation process
before the Attorney General decides to authorize a capital prosecution. Yet,
while the Attorney General considers the preferences of the local United
States Attorney in seeking death, the formal decision to authorize any federal
capital-eligible case is made in Washington D.C. and not in the physical
space or among the actors of the courtroom workgroups across the ninetyfour federal judicial districts.170 For that matter, even if there were a local
cultural effect in the authorization process, one can imagine it operating
independently of the decision to provide defense resources at trial—
especially since the former decision is governed by prosecutors and the
provision of resources is in the hands of judges.	
  
A final caveat to our results concerns the time period and type of defense
represented in our dataset. Our findings are based upon the universe of all
federal capital-authorized cases that went to trial during 1998–2004 in which
a panel attorney was appointed under the Criminal Justice Act. Although the
large majority of federal capital defendants was represented by these panel
attorneys and not by public defenders or private attorneys, it is possible—
indeed probable—that defendants in those other cases received a different
level of resources, especially since federal public defenders have their own
budgets and do not need to secure court approval for expert assistance. For
that matter, it is possible that federal capital practice has changed in the years
following our data. But at the mid-point of the modern death penalty, when
federal capital prosecutions were at their height, our data suggest that there
were significant, systematic differences in the level of defense support
provided capital defendants that cannot be explained by legally cognizable
facts.	
  
Local legal culture and the specific qualities pertaining to the courtroom
workgroup are under-specified and under-theorized concepts in the body of
empirical literature surrounding capital punishment. Whereas prior research
has identified regional differences in capital case outcomes, we have sought
to operationalize local legal culture and apply it to an earlier stage of the
capital process—the resources made available to indigent defendants.	
  
In a federal system in which the death penalty is presumably applied
more consistently than across and between the states, we find a high degree
170
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of variation in defense resources, a variation that turns as much on subcultural
expectations, attitudes, and actual practices as it does on legally cognizable
case facts. When those systemic and systematic differences are also
correlated with the most serious case outcomes—death sentences—we
believe there is cause for concern. But, even if we read our results narrowly,
we find that the local punitive culture, the background of the presiding judge,
the caseload and speed of the court’s docket, and the race of the defendant
influence the type of lawyer appointed and the level of resources defendants
receive to defend themselves. That these factors are extralegal, that they are
linked to the lowest-level of defense resources, and that they stand between
a defendant and his opportunity to defend against a death sentence, means
that the consequences are real and quite troubling.	
  
We welcome further research into these questions, including the variants
of legal culture that influence court outcomes and the relationship between
defense resources and case outcomes. Ultimately, these questions reflect a
larger, structural conflict embedded in federalism—whether it is possible to
administer a uniform and unbiased federal death penalty system when
courtroom actors cannot be kept in vacuum-sealed federal courthouses but
instead are embedded in the cultural practices of their local areas and districts.
That question falls beyond the scope of this study. However, statistical
methods paired with innovations in how we theorize about subcultural
processes can help advance our understanding of the extent to which
extralegal forces exist within a purportedly uniform system where both life
and liberty are at stake.	
  

